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2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Activities of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy relating to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

Memorandum of the African Union Commission

The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, was signed in Cairo on 11 April 1996 and entered into force on 15 July 2009. The Treaty, for which the Chair of the African Union Commission is the depositary, prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the Zone territory of States parties and the dumping of radioactive waste in the African Zone. It also prohibits any attack against nuclear installations in the Zone by the parties and requires them to maintain the highest standards of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment, which are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The Treaty has three Protocols: the first two commit States parties not to use or threaten to use a nuclear device against any territory within the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, as well as not to undertake, assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the Zone. These two Protocols are open for signature by the five recognized nuclear-weapon States.

The third Protocol, which is open for signature by France and Spain, concerns the territories for which they are de jure or de facto internationally responsible, and which are situated within the Zone. The Protocol commits them not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty.

African Commission on Nuclear Energy

Article 12 of the Treaty of Pelindaba establishes the African Commission on Nuclear Energy as the body responsible for, inter alia, ensuring States parties' compliance with their obligations under the Treaty and the Protocols thereto and promoting cooperation in the peaceful, safe and secure uses of nuclear science and technology in the continent, as well as advancing global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Since the entry into force of the Treaty, the Commission of the African Union has served as the transitional secretariat for all related matters pending the

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operationalization of the secretariat of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, and thus facilitated and supported the convening of the various related decision-making forums. These include four ordinary sessions of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy and two Conferences of States Parties to the Treaty.

First Conference of States Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba

The First Conference of States Parties to the Treaty was held in Addis Ababa on 4 November 2010 in accordance with article 14 of the Treaty, which calls for a conference of all States parties to be convened as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Treaty to, inter alia, elect members of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy and determine its headquarters. The parties elected, with due regard to equitable regional representation, 12 members of the Commission for a three-year term. These are: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Togo and Tunisia. The Conference also endorsed the decision to establish the headquarters of the Commission in South Africa.

Following the First Conference of States Parties, States parties elected to the membership of the Commission submitted to the Chair of the Commission the names and credentials of high-calibre professionals with vast experience in the area of nuclear science and technology, diplomacy and security as their Commissioners. These are: Messaoud Baaliouamer of Algeria; Badiori Outtara of Burkina Faso; Augustin Simo of Cameroon; Atnatiwos Zeleke Meshesha of Ethiopia; Shaukat Abdulrazak of Kenya; Bulgasem Hammouda Ali El-Fawaris of Libya; Tezana Coulibaly of Mali; Anund P. Neewor of Mauritius; Christian Sina Diatta of Senegal; Abdul Samad Minty of South Africa; Manzi Pidalatan of Togo; and Mourad Telmini of Tunisia.

First ordinary session of the Commission

Pursuant to article 12, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which commits the Commission to meet in annual ordinary sessions, the Commission facilitated the convening of its first ordinary session in Addis Ababa on 5 May 2011. The purpose of the session was to discuss various aspects related to the effective operationalization of the Commission; these included the rules of procedure, structure, programme of work, terms of reference for the Executive Secretary, budget and scale of assessment for States parties' contributions. The session also elected the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Commission in line with the provisions of the Treaty.

Regarding the Bureau of the Commission, which is provided for in annex III, paragraph 2, to the Treaty of Pelindaba, and which should consist of the Chair, the Vice-Chair and the Executive Secretary, the first ordinary session decided that the position of Executive Secretary should be filled through a competitive process administered by the Commission and conducted in accordance with its rules and regulations. On the positions of Chair and Vice-Chair of the Commission, the session unanimously elected Abdul Samad Minty of South Africa and Mourad Telmini of Tunisia as Chair and Vice-Chair, respectively.

Furthermore, the first ordinary session requested the Commission to administer a competitive process for the recruitment of the Executive Secretary of the Commission, which the Commission finalized in February 2012. In line with the

provisions of the Treaty, the Chair of the Commission and Commission members considered and endorsed the recommendation of the recruitment panel.

On the scale of assessment, the first ordinary session agreed to adopt the scale of assessment of the African Union for 2011-2013, adopted by the seventeenth ordinary session of the Executive Council, held in Kampala on 25 July 2010.

Second ordinary session of the Commission

The second ordinary session of the Commission was held in Addis Ababa on 26 July 2012 to finalize and adopt the key documents before submitting them to the Conference of States Parties for endorsement. The session also discussed operational measures and timelines for the activation of the Commission secretariat, including the setting up and staffing of the headquarters of the Commission in accordance with minimum requirements and in the light of the preparations made by the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

Second Conference of States Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba

Subsequently, the Second Conference of States Parties was held in Addis Ababa on 12 and 13 November 2012 in accordance with article 12, paragraph 2 (b), of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which stipulates that the Commission shall convene a Conference of States Parties on any matter arising from the implementation of the Treaty, and with article 14, paragraph 1, which stipulates that a Conference of States Parties shall be held as necessary and at least once every two years. The objective of the Second Conference of States Parties was to bring together countries of the Zone, the concerned extra-zonal countries and the relevant regional and international bodies to consider matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the operationalization of the Commission secretariat, as well as other issues of concern to the Zone.

The Second Conference of States Parties called on African Union member States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba without further delay. It also appealed to the concerned non-African States to speedily sign and ratify the relevant Protocols to the Treaty and to comply with all the commitments contained therein.

The Second Conference of States Parties took note of the briefing provided by the Commission and its Chair on the conclusions of the first and second ordinary sessions of the Commission. The Conference considered and adopted the documents relating to the structure of the Commission, its programme of work, budget and scale of assessment for the period 2013-2015. The Conference also took note of the rules of procedure of the Commission and the terms of reference of the Executive Secretary of the Commission secretariat. The Conference further encouraged States parties to honour their financial obligations towards the Commission.

Third ordinary session of the Commission

The third ordinary session of the Commission was held in Pretoria on 11 and 12 November 2013 to discuss matters relating to the operationalization of the Commission secretariat and the implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba within the context of the outcome of the Second Conference of States Parties.

In implementation of the programme of work of the Commission, the third ordinary session, pursuant to rule 18 of the rules of procedure of the Commission, endorsed the establishment and membership of two working groups of the Commission for the implementation of the relevant aspects of the guidelines for the programme of work of the Commission. Group 1 was assigned to address the topics of (a) monitoring States parties' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, and (b) nuclear and radiation safety and security, while Group 2 was assigned to address the topics of (c) nuclear sciences and applications, and (d) partnerships and technical cooperation.

The third ordinary session further considered the draft national reporting template and the draft guide for States parties for reporting under article 13 of the Treaty. It was agreed that further efforts and consultations would be undertaken in order to finalize the reporting template in due course to ensure timely reporting by States parties.

Taking into consideration that the Commissioners' three-year mandate would come to an end in 2014, the third ordinary session endorsed the proposal to convene the Third Conference of States Parties in May 2014 to, inter alia, elect 12 States parties to the membership of the Commission with a view to ensuring the continuity of the programme of work of the Commission.

Fourth ordinary session of the Commission

The fourth ordinary session of the Commission was held in Addis Ababa on 27 May 2014 to gain an overview of the progress made in implementation of the programme of work and finalize the Commission's report for submission to the subsequent Third Conference of States Parties.

Third Conference of States Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba

The Third Conference of States Parties was held in Addis Ababa on 29 and 30 May 2014 to review the status of the operationalization of the Commission secretariat and the status of States parties' contributions to the 2013-2015 budget, and to address other issues relating to the implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba. The Conference was also convened to elect 12 States parties, in accordance with paragraph 1 of annex III to the Treaty, to the membership of the Commission for a three-year term.

The Third Conference of States Parties took note of the comprehensive report provided by the Chair of the Commission on the status of the operationalization of the Commission secretariat and the appointment of the Executive Secretary, as well as the status of States parties' assessed contributions to the budget of the Commission for the period 2013-2015, as adopted by the Second Conference of States Parties. The Third Conference of States Parties further took note of the progress made by the Commission in implementation of the different pillars of its programme of work, including in the areas of monitoring States parties' compliance with their Treaty obligations; nuclear and radiation safety and security; nuclear sciences and applications; and partnerships and technical cooperation with the relevant regional and international bodies.

The Third Conference of States Parties welcomed the results of the assessment undertaken by the Commission, which concluded that all activities conducted by

States parties were in full compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations, while noting that important work still had to be done to strengthen safety and security programmes. It further emphasized the need for Commission activities to be geared towards providing the necessary technical expertise and support to States parties in order to fully benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology for socioeconomic development, including in the areas of human and animal health, food and agriculture, water resources, sustainable energy development and industry.

The Third Conference of States Parties further welcomed the various initiatives undertaken by the Commission to promote and strengthen coordination and collaboration with the relevant regional and international organizations, including the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Forum for Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa, in order to optimize resources and address gaps.

The Third Conference of States Parties took note of the fact that only 26.04 per cent of the Commission's budget was covered, and thus called on all States parties to honour their financial obligations towards the budget of the Commission, as adopted by the Second Conference of States Parties, in order to enable the Commission to effectively and consistently implement its programme of work in a manner that ensures full ownership by States parties.

The Third Conference of States Parties took note of the tentative road map developed by the Commission for the period 2014-2016, which will, inter alia, work towards ensuring the appointment of national focal points by States parties, strengthening cooperation with regional and international organizations, and consideration of the establishment of regional verification systems and securing the appropriate resources, including human resources development and infrastructure.

With regard to the membership of the Commission, the Third Conference of States Parties elected, in line with the relevant provisions of annex III to the Treaty of Pelindaba, the following States parties as members of the Commission for a three-year term: Algeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia and Zimbabwe.

The fifth ordinary session of the Commission is expected to be held once all elected members designate their Commissioners.

The status of ratification of the Treaty of Pelindaba can be found on the following link: http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/pelindaba%20Treaty.pdf.

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Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and previous Review Conference outcomes

Report submitted by Portugal

Introduction

1. Portugal regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and a critical instrument to maintain the stability of international security. Portugal considers it necessary for all States to be committed to the validity of this Treaty as an international instrument.

2. The action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and based on the 13 practical steps defined at the 2000 Review Conference represents a great achievement towards the collective effort on disarmament and non-proliferation and a guarantee of the much-needed holistic development of the three pillars that compose the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These three pillars must complement each other in order to assure not only a safer world but also the proper use of nuclear energy for peaceful applications which, in turn, will promote collective development on a sustainable basis.

3. Honouring its international commitments, Portugal is fully engaged with the goals, object and purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to achieve the common aspiration of its parties of a world free of nuclear weapons. This pledge must be balanced with common efforts concerning the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and technology.

First pillar: nuclear disarmament (actions 1 to 22 of the action plan)

4. Portugal acknowledges and fully supports the efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to improve any measures to ascertain irreversibility, transparency and verifiability. In that regard, Portugal fully stands by the promotion of global disarmament, including as one of its national objectives, as established in article 7(2) of its Constitution. Moreover, in terms of transparency

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and verifiability. Portugal fully meets these principles, having comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which include an additional protocol. Additionally, Portugal reports to several bodies, such as the European Union, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Hague Code of Conduct.

5. Portugal also cooperates with the European Organization for Nuclear Research, the European Radiation Dosimetry Group and the European Association of National Metrology Institutes in the fields of radiological protection and safety, dosimetry and metrology of ionizing radiation and is part of such European Union technology platforms as the Multidisciplinary European Low Dose Initiative and the Implementing Geological Disposal Technology Platform (action 1).

6. Portugal has defended, in various instances, the need for the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a more complete and inclusive workplan. In fact, in line with its national commitments on disarmament, Portugal has insisted on becoming a member of the Conference on Disarmament (action 6). Portugal also participated in the 2010 high-level meeting on revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations. However, it is our firm belief that this kind of meeting must not replace the application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in its entirety or put in jeopardy its own institutional structure (action 7).

7. Portugal fully supports the great importance of the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, urging the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as the implementation of the action plan, approved by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference. Portugal regrets that a conference among the States of the region has not taken place yet, despite the tireless efforts of Ambassador Jaakko Laajava. Portugal hopes that this conference will occur in the future, and we are actively participating in conferences and seminars that seek to encourage political dialogue on these matters. Portugal is also promoting the conference bilaterally (action 9).

8. Portugal is a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and has participated in all article XIV conferences (action 12). Portugal has defended the need for the universalization of the Treaty and has been encouraging States, including the Annex 2 States, through multilateral and bilateral demarches, to ratify the Treaty (action 10); it has also actively promoted the provision of training to some countries regarding the promotion of the Treaty and the implementation of the National Regulatory Authority (action 13). Regarding States that are not parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Portugal has defended the establishment of a moratorium on all kinds of nuclear tests (action 11). Portugal participates in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime and, in line with article 25 (1) (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, applies provisionally the International Monitoring System according to article IV (1) (a) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

9. Portugal has also established a facility agreement with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization for the stations located on its territory. It has extended the use of the civilian national seismic detection services in order to benefit from the Provisional

Technical Secretariat data regarding tsunami alerts (action 14). Portugal supports the idea of developing the appropriate verification regime.

10. Having co-sponsored the IAEA resolutions regarding safeguards, Portugal has actively promoted, in bilateral demarches and public interventions, the need for the signature and ratification of comprehensive safeguards agreements, including additional protocols, with IAEA. It has also provided its own version, in the Portuguese language, of its safeguards agreement to other countries, seeking to encourage and facilitate the establishment of such agreements with IAEA by other States (action 17).

11. Portugal supports cooperation among all stakeholders regarding the increase in confidence-building measures (actions 19 and 21). Several Portuguese universities have included non-proliferation and disarmament education in their curriculums, mostly in a broad manner within subjects such as geopolitics and international relations. Portugal has promoted several specific training courses on this subject: the Nuclear Technology Institute and the Portuguese Environment Agency have held dedicated courses on the subject of nuclear safety, regarding, inter alia, regulatory frameworks. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an active role in education on non-proliferation and disarmament: it has promoted lectures in post-graduate courses and has integrated trainees, through training-on-the-job, in the meetings of the First Committee of the General Assembly (action 22).

Second pillar: non-proliferation (actions 23 to 46 of the action plan)

12. Regarding non-proliferation efforts, Portugal has consistently appealed, in a joint effort with all States members of the European Union, for the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, having developed several demarches in that regard, in a bilateral and multilateral context (action 23). Portugal has established safeguards agreements with IAEA, in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has an additional protocol (action 24). Regarding the safeguards agreements and additional protocols, Portugal has diligently executed several demarches with African Portuguese-speaking countries and East Timor and has provided its own additional protocol in the Portuguese language in order to facilitate the adoption of those instruments (actions 25, 28, 29 and 30). It has also intervened in several international forums in order to reaffirm the importance of the balance between the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its safeguards agreements (action 26). Portugal has also cooperated with IAEA at all levels to uphold the safeguards obligations of its version. In 2011-2012, Portugal, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, assumed the chairmanship of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (action 27).

13. Portugal has had a very active position towards the wider application of the IAEA safeguards agreements, but also regarding the small quantities protocols, in which Portugal actively seeks to encourage States to adopt and/or amend them. In that sense, Portugal has made several demarches in countries such as São Tomé and Príncipe and East Timor to conclude such agreements (action 31).

14. Portugal has also been supportive of the IAEA efforts regarding the State-level concept, but it also realizes that there is still work to be done regarding radiological threats and the control of radiological products (action 32). Portugal has fulfilled its financial commitments with IAEA and its technical and political obligations on a

bilateral level, as well as its participation in international organizations such as the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Union (actions 34 and 51).

15. Portugal has high standards regarding the control of products and technology that can be used in the development of nuclear or radiological weapons. Besides the national legislation and the application of European Union Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009, Portugal is also part of several international regimes and initiatives in this context, such as the Megaports Initiative, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and has had an active posture regarding information exchanges with intelligence services, namely on counter-proliferation (actions 35, 36 and 37). The relevant national stakeholders apply the pertinent IAEA programmes (action 44), particularly those that concern regulatory matters. Portugal maintains productive cooperation with other countries, particularly in the context of the Country Programme Framework (action 46). Despite this tight export regime, Portugal maintains a firm commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear technology and materials and has imported and exported (mainly to Africa) radioactive isotopes for medical use, both for diagnosis and treatment, assuring at the same time the required technical cooperation and training activities (actions 38 and 39).

16. As far as security and physical safety of nuclear materials and facilities are concerned, Portugal stands by the appropriate international standards, having created the Portuguese Regulatory Commission for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (Decree-Law No. 30/2012 of 9 February 2012) and having fully transposed to its national legal order European Union Council Directives 2011/70 and 2009/71 regarding the safe management of radioactive waste and spent fuel and nuclear safety. It also ratified the amendments to article 6 of the IAEA statute in December 2013 (actions 40, 41 and 42) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 25 September 2014 (action 45).

Third pillar: peaceful uses of nuclear energy (actions 47 to 64 of the action plan)

17. Portugal gives preference to the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding their specific needs, mostly for medical isotopes for both diagnosis and medical treatment (action 50). It has non-discriminate policies towards States regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has no barriers as far as the import of energy or goods produced with the resource of nuclear technology are concerned. Portugal actively supports the development of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, developing outreach activities and training courses with several countries, namely, in Africa and the Mediterranean region (actions 47, 48, 49, 51 and 53). Moreover, it signed a Country Framework Programme with IAEA in 2013 and cooperates with States in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Portugal has also contributed in kind for the activities of IAEA and the Provisional Technical Secretariat (actions 52, 53, 54 and 56). In addition, it also participates in the European Union efforts, with extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA, in particular to the Nuclear Security Unit, within European Union contributions (action 55).

18. Portugal has at its disposal a wide range of national legislation and is part of all major international forums and legal instruments regarding matters relating to atomic energy and diligently applies the IAEA standards concerning peaceful uses

of atomic energy. Portugal has also been active in the creation of the low enriched uranium bank, in particular while a member of the IAEA Board of Governors (2010-2012) (actions 58 and 63).

19. Portugal has ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and has also acceded to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (action 59).

20. Portugal has promoted several outreach activities directed to its industry, in order to promote best practices regarding safety and security and also in order to present its relevant national and international legislation on this subject. It has promoted conceptual hydrogeological circulation models of Cabeço de Vide mineral waters and in Melgaço-Messagães (action 60). A conference was organized in order to raise awareness and to train doctors, nurses and other practitioners within the health system on radiological protection (actions 56 and 61).

21. In terms of international standards in transport safety, security and environmental protection, Portugal applies the major international legislation and has at its disposal the means to combat nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical Disasters, with the capabilities at its disposal of its armed forces and civil protection services. Portugal has also participated in international events and seminars regarding these aspects and has actively cooperated, together with other interested States, in the process that resulted in the adoption of resolution GC(58)/RES/10, at the fifty-eighth IAEA General Conference, regarding measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. As a mainly coastal State, Portugal was involved in the Working Group on Best Practice Guidelines for Voluntary and Confidential Government to Government Communications on the Transport of Mox Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste and, as appropriate, irradiated Nuclear Fuel by Sea (action 62).

22. Portugal is party to some liability instruments and has supported, in line with the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, a global nuclear liability regime which must be non-discriminatory and multilateral, and encompasses the unilateral involuntary risks and the associated accident costs.

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Memorandum on activities of the Kyrgyz Republic in its capacity as the depositary of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

1. The present memorandum was prepared pursuant to paragraph 3 (g) of annex VI to the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and regional security, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan signed the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, on 8 September 2006.

3. The Central Asian States — the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan — have made an invaluable contribution to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, and to its advancement and development. Active work in this area has been carried out in various international forums, including at sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the 2005 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission.

4. The United Nations General Assembly adopted resolutions 52/38 S of 9 December 1997, 53/77 A of 4 December 1998, 55/33 W of 20 November 2000, 57/69 of 22 November 2002, 61/88 of 6 December 2006, 63/63 of 2 December 2008, 65/49 of 8 December 2010 and 67/31 of 3 December 2012, and decisions 54/417 of 1 December 1999, 56/412 of 29 November 2001, 58/518 of 8 December 2003, 59/513 of 3 December 2004 and 60/516 of 8 December 2005, concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

5. The Kyrgyz Republic was designated as depositary by the Parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (article 18).

6. In accordance with article 18, the Kyrgyz Republic transmitted certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocol to all States of Central Asia and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

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7. During the period 2006-2009, all Parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia ratified the Treaty. Upon receipt of the last instrument of ratification, the Kyrgyz Republic advised the Parties to the Treaty and its Protocol of the entry into force of the Treaty as from 21 March 2009 (article 15).

8. On 20 March 2009, on the eve of the official entry into force of the Treaty, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed this event in a statement circulated as an official document to delegations of States Members of the United Nations.

9. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, together with the delegation of the Kyrgyz Republic, issued an official United Nations map showing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

10. Important events for the Kyrgyz Republic, in its capacity as depositary of the Treaty, were its participation in the first meeting of representatives of States parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones (Ulaanbaatar, 27-28 April 2009), the meeting of States parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones held within the framework of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 4-5 May 2010), the sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

11. In accordance with rule 2 of the rules of procedure to implement article 10 of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, the Kyrgyz Republic organized a series of meetings in New York of permanent representatives to the United Nations of the Parties to the Treaty as well as experts in order to determine the date and venue for the first consultative meeting.

12. The outcome of those meetings was unanimous endorsement of the proposal by Turkmenistan to hold the consultative meeting in Ashgabat.

13. The first consultative meeting of the Parties to the Treaty was held in Ashgabat on 15 October 2009. Turkmenistan chaired this meeting on the Treaty, in close collaboration with the depositary.

14. Subsequent meetings were held in Tashkent (15 March 2011), Astana (12 June 2012 and 27 June 2013) and Almaty (25 July 2014).

15. During the period 2013-2014, the Parties to the Treaty held consultations with the nuclear-weapon States under article 9, paragraph 3, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (French Republic, People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America) with a view to their signing the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. As a result, a ceremony for the signature of the above-mentioned Protocol by the nuclear-weapon States was held in New York on 6 May 2014. The Kyrgyz Republic is the depositary of the Protocol.

16. Pursuant to article 7, the Protocol to the Treaty enters into force for each Party to the Protocol (under article 4, the Parties to the Protocol are the French Republic, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America) on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

17. The French Republic ratified the Protocol to the Treaty on 17 October 2014 and deposited its instrument of ratification with the Kyrgyz Republic on 17 November 2014, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ratified the Protocol to the Treaty on 19 January 2015 and deposited its instrument of ratification with the Kyrgyz Republic on 30 January 2015.

18. The remaining nuclear-weapon States, as at 1 February 2015, have not yet ratified the Protocol.

19. On 2 December 2014, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 69/36 entitled "Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia". In the resolution, the Assembly welcomes the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia on 6 May 2014 by the nuclear-weapon States and calls upon them to take measures for its early ratification.

20. On 25 December 2014, the Kyrgyz Republic assumed the chairmanship of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

21. During its chairmanship, the Kyrgyz Republic, together with the other Parties to the Treaty, intends to continue consultations with the nuclear-weapon States in order to accelerate their ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty.

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Memorandum of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

1. Pursuant to the decisions on background documentation adopted by the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) presents a memorandum regarding the Agency's activities related to the Treaty that have taken place since the 2010 Review Conference.

Control system of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and regional and external activities of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

Compliance with obligations established by the control system of the Treaty of Tlatelolco

2. Under article 14 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, contracting parties are obliged to submit semi-annual reports to OPANAL stating that no activity prohibited under the Treaty has occurred in their respective territories. The dates of the latest reports submitted by OPANAL member States are shown in annex I.

3. The Secretary-General will continue to encourage all contracting parties to submit their reports twice a year, in compliance with article 14 of the Treaty.

4. While article 24 is not strictly part of the control system, it is another important obligation of States parties. Under article 24, States are required to inform the Agency of any international agreement concluded by them on matters with which the Treaty is concerned. Unlike article 14, article 24 does not establish a specific periodicity for States to submit their reports in this regard (see annex II).

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

5. Since the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was created in Caracas on 3 December 2011, the Heads of State and Government of

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Latin American and Caribbean countries have given great importance to the region's political stand on nuclear disarmament. On the occasion of the establishment of CELAC, they issued a special communique on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in which they confirmed that Latin America and the Caribbean was proud to be the first densely populated area in the world to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone, by means of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see para. 2 of the statement, contained in A/66/647, annex).

6. In the final declaration of the first CELAC Summit, held in Santiago on 27 and 28 January 2013, the Heads of State and Government of Latin American and Caribbean countries reaffirmed the commitment of their States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their support for the conclusion of legally binding instruments that would lead to effective, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament (see A/67/842, annex, para. 47).

7. One year later, in the final declaration of the second CELAC Summit, held in Havana on 28 and 29 January 2014, the Heads of State and Government of Latin American and Caribbean countries reaffirmed the importance of the collaboration and cooperation between CELAC and OPANAL, the specialized body in the region for articulating common positions and joint actions on nuclear disarmament (see para. 72 of the declaration, contained in A/68/914, annex). During the summit, a special declaration on nuclear disarmament was issued, in which the Heads of State and Government of Latin American and Caribbean countries also reaffirmed the importance of the link and cooperation between CELAC and OPANAL, the specialized regional body to harmonize a common stance, and of the joint work to achieve nuclear disarmament (see para. 25).

8. In the political declaration of the third CELAC Summit, held in Belén, Costa Rica, on 28 and 29 January 2015, the Heads of State and Government of Latin American and Caribbean countries reiterated that complete, transparent, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament was an important goal of CELAC States and that the only effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination and prohibition. In that context, the States members of CELAC supported the negotiation of a universal, legally binding instrument proscribing nuclear weapons with a multilaterally agreed timetable. As they had done at the second Summit, States adopted, at the third Summit, a special declaration on nuclear disarmament, this one specifically on the urgent need for a nuclear-weapon-free world, in which it was reiterated that OPANAL was the specialized body of CELAC for nuclear disarmament.

External relations of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

9. OPANAL has maintained relations with several international organizations and civil society organizations. The Agency has participated in the general debate of the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of OPANAL, Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares, is advocating that OPANAL join a relevant panel during the thematic discussion of the First Committee. Moreover, he has taken part in the sessions of the Preparatory Committee and will be at the Review Conference to be held in April and May 2015.

10. As requested, the secretariat has provided information for inclusion in the reports of the United Nations Secretary-General on topics related to the work of OPANAL.

11. OPANAL has actively participated in and promoted the three conferences of the States parties and signatories to treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia, the first two of which were coordinated by Mexico (2005) and Chile (2010), respectively.

12. OPANAL has maintained its important relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as provided for in articles 13 and 19 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In 2011, the former OPANAL Secretary-General, Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, participated in the IAEA event entitled "Forum on experience of possible relevance to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East", held in Vienna on 21 and 22 November. In 2012, the Director General of IAEA, Yukiya Amano, participated in the OPANAL international seminar entitled "The experience of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean and the perspective towards 2015 and beyond", held in Mexico City on 14 and 15 February.

13. Furthermore, on 16 June 2011, the former OPANAL Secretary-General participated in the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the current Secretary-General is planning to participate in March 2015.

14. Over the past five years, OPANAL Secretaries-General have also participated in several seminars and workshops on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation organized by the ministries of foreign affairs and other institutions of the following member States: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.

15. OPANAL has maintained close relations with the Organization of American States (OAS). In 2010, the former OPANAL Secretary-General attended the thirty-ninth special session of the OAS General Assembly. Pursuant to OAS General Assembly resolution AG/RES. 2624 (XLI-O/11), entitled "Consolidation of the regime established in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)", the contents of which are adopted by the Committee on Hemispheric Security on a regular basis, OPANAL Secretaries-General addressed the Committee in 2013 and 2014.

16. The Agency has also held bilateral meetings with the Secretary of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. All those high-profile representatives, together with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, participated in the international seminar mentioned in paragraph 12 above.

17. Concerning OPANAL relations with civil society organizations, since 2010 OPANAL Secretaries-General have met with representatives from organizations such as: Mayors for Peace, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Soka Gakkai International, Non-Proliferation for Global Security Foundation, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Global Security Institute, Global Consortium on Security Transformation and World Future Council Foundation.

18. On 23 October 2013, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was chosen among 24 nominated policies as the winner of the 2013 Future Policy Gold Award presented by the World Future Council Foundation, the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

19. OPANAL continues to promote interactive relations with several academic institutions, including the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute for International Studies and the Latin American Institute for Educational Communication, as well as various universities in Latin American countries.

Views, positions and resolutions of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean concerning matters related to the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, with special reference to actions contained in the section entitled "Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions" (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I))

I. Nuclear disarmament

Actions 3-6: qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons

20. During its twenty-third regular session, held in Buenos Aires on 21 and 22 August 2013, the General Conference of OPANAL adopted resolution CG/Res.563, entitled "Urgent need for general and complete nuclear disarmament", in which it demanded the cessation of the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons (para. 4).

21. In October 2014, during the sixty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations in New York circulated the declaration of the States members of OPANAL on the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, in which the States members called upon nuclear-weapon States to cease the development of new types of nuclear weapons (see A/C.1/69/2, annex, para. 4).

Actions 3-7: legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons

22. Also in that declaration, the States members of OPANAL affirmed the pressing need to begin negotiations for the prompt conclusion of a universal and legally binding instrument prohibiting the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their destruction in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner under a multilaterally agreed timetable (ibid., para. 2).

Action 5: article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

23. In their 2011 declaration, the States members of OPANAL noted that it was a responsibility of all States, particularly of nuclear-weapon States, from whom improvements were expected in their commitment to accelerate concrete progress on measures aimed to achieve nuclear disarmament, established in Measure 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, towards a full entry into force of the provisions of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see A/C.1/66/2, annex, para. 20).

Action 5 (c): role of nuclear weapons in security policies

24. The States members of OPANAL, in their 2014 declaration, called upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their doctrines, security policies and military strategies (see A/C.1/69/2, annex, para. 3).

Security assurances

Actions 6-7: Conference on Disarmament

25. In its resolution CG/Res.563 of 22 August 2013, entitled "Urgent need for general and complete nuclear disarmament", the OPANAL General Conference urged the Conference on Disarmament to demonstrate the necessary political will in order to ensure the commencement without delay of substantive work through the adoption and implementation of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that advances the agenda of nuclear disarmament (para. 7).

Actions 7-8: threat or use of nuclear weapons

26. In their 2011 declaration, the States members of OPANAL reaffirmed that the use of or threat to use nuclear weapons is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity (see A/C.1/66/2, annex, para. 4).

Action 9: negative security assurances

27. In that same declaration, the States members of OPANAL affirmed that it is a legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States to be given unequivocal, legally binding guarantees from nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use such weapons against them (ibid., para. 5).

Action 9: interpretative declarations of nuclear-weapon States to additional protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco

28. On 8 December 2010, during its sixty-fifth session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted, without a vote, its resolution 65/40, entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)". In that resolution, the Assembly encouraged States that had ratified the relevant Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to review any reservations in that regard, in accordance with action 9 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference (para. 3).

29. On 5 December 2013, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 68/26, which has the same title and the same content as resolution 65/40.

30. In a press release issued on 26 June 2014, OPANAL member States welcomed the signature of the Protocol to the Treaty of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by the five nuclear-weapon States in New York on 6 May 2014. Moreover, they expressed the view that it was essential, for the full consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, that nuclear-weapon States sign the protocols to the treaties on such zones. In that respect, they also expressed the view that any restrictions to the terms and scope of such protocols would be detrimental to the goal and purpose of those treaties.

Action 9: establishment of permanent bodies in nuclear-weapon-free zones

31. In their 2011 declaration, the States members of OPANAL called upon all other nuclear-weapon-free zones to consider the establishment of permanent bodies similar to the ones created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) (see A/C.1/66/2, annex, para. 10).

Action 9: establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones

32. In that same declaration, the States members of OPANAL stated that they expected progress in the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as the ones suggested in North-East Asia and the Middle East (ibid., para. 13).

Nuclear testing

Action 10: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

33. Also in that same declaration, the States members of OPANAL reiterated their demand for the binding cessation of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions, as well as the need to achieve universal adhesion to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty from all nuclear-weapon States in particular, and the States mentioned in annex 2 of the Treaty (ibid., para. 17).

34. On 12 January 2012, Guatemala ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, becoming the thirty-first State member of OPANAL to do so. Cuba and Dominica have neither signed nor ratified it yet; however, because they are not listed in annex 2 of the Treaty, they do not represent an obstacle to its entry into force.

35. In April 2013, the OPANAL Council, in its resolution C/Res.55, reiterated its strongest condemnation against the conduct of any nuclear tests anywhere in the world (para. 1). It also exhorted the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rejoin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear-weapon State, and to adopt without delay a moratorium on nuclear-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions (para. 2).

Other measures in support of nuclear disarmament

Action 19: cooperation with other existing nuclear-weapon-free zones

36. At its twenty-third regular session, held in Buenos Aires on 21 and 22 August 2013, the General Conference of OPANAL adopted its resolution CG/Res.554, entitled "Strategic agenda of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean", in which it expressed the view that cooperation with other nuclear-weapon-free zones, relevant international organizations and instances of civil society was indispensable for implementing concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament.

37. The General Assembly of the United Nations, in its resolution 65/40, encouraged OPANAL member States to continue its activities and efforts with a view to implementing the agreements reached at the first and second conferences of States parties and signatories to treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones" (para. 4).

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

Action 26: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

38. All 33 States members of OPANAL are contracting parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and have concluded their specific safeguards agreements with IAEA, thereby complying with article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Action 47: peaceful uses of nuclear energy

39. In their 2014 declaration, the States members of OPANAL reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States, in conformity with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination (see A/C.1/69/2, annex, para. 6).

Excerpt from the statement by the Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean delivered at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Four issues could concentrate the attention of next year's Conference.

The first is the reinforcement of the zones, for which it is essential that the zones exchange information about their peculiar situations and the problems they face.

The second concerns the question of negative security assurances, which are crucial for the zones. Their member States have assumed legally binding assurances vis-à-vis all the other States, including the nuclear-weapon States. It is morally, politically and legally indispensable that a reciprocal undertaking in the form of a treaty be accepted by nuclear-weapon States.

A third and urgent issue is the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. No one can ignore the obstacles that the States in the region face to achieving this universally desired goal. Let us not use the obstacles as an excuse to not make progress in that direction.

When, some 50 years ago, Latin American and Caribbean countries started the negotiation of what came to be the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the political conditions and the strategic situation in our region, including the impact on it of the cold war's competing superpowers, could not have been more adverse to such an endeavour. In a large part of the region, the prevailing political regimes and the low level of confidence among many States were not conducive to a strategic understanding among them.

Annex I

Status of compliance with article 14 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco

Member State	*Reports received by the first half of 2010*	*Reports received by the second half of 2014*
Antigua and Barbuda	30 June 1995	31 January 2015
Argentina	30 June 2010	30 June 2014
Bahamas	30 June 2010	30 June 2010
Barbados	31 December 1984	31 December 1984
Belize**		30 June 2014
Bolivia	30 June 2009	15 November 2011
Brazil	30 June 2010	31 December 2014
Chile	31 December 2009	31 December 2013
Colombia	30 June 2010	30 June 2014
Costa Rica	30 June 2009	22 July 2014
Cuba	30 June 2010	31 December 2014
Dominica	12 June 2010	16 August 2013
Dominican Republic	31 December 1999	29 March 2013
Ecuador	30 June 2010	30 June 2014
El Salvador	30 June 2009	30 June 2014
Grenada	30 June 1981	31 January 2014
Guatemala	30 June 2009	31 December 2013
Guyana*		15 December 2014
Haiti	30 June 1996	31 December 2013
Honduras	31 December 1989	31 December 1989
Jamaica	30 June 2010	31 December 2013
Mexico	30 June 2010	31 December 2014
Nicaragua	30 June 2005	31 December 2013
Panama	30 June 2001	30 June 2011
Paraguay	30 June 1998	1 July 2013

Member State	*Reports received by the first half of 2013*	*Reports received by the second half of 2014*
Peru	30 June 2008	31 December 2013
Saint Kitts and Nevis*		30 June 2014
Saint Lucia*		25 July 2013
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	31 December 2007	31 July 2014
Suriname	31 December 1993	30 June 2011
Trinidad and Tobago	31 December 2005	24 July 2013
Uruguay	30 June 2008	30 June 2014
Venezuela	31 December 2009	31 December 2013

* Complied with article 14 for the first time in 2012.

** Complied with article 14 for the first time in 2013, when finally all Member States had sent their reports.

Annex II

Status of compliance with article 24 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco

Member State	*Reports received by 16 February 2014*
Antigua and Barbuda*	3 February 2015
Argentina*	22 October 2014
Bahamas	10 May 2007
Barbados	10 April 1984
Belize	
Bolivia*	23 November 2011
Brazil	23 September 2013
Chile	25 February 2005
Colombia*	2 April 2014
Costa Rica	
Cuba*	8 January 2014
Dominica*	12 September 2012
Dominican Republic	7 August 1987
Ecuador	25 August 2014
El Salvador	22 September 2010
Grenada	13 September 1980
Guatemala	2 December 2010
Guyana	16 September 2010
Haiti	31 July 1973
Honduras	8 November 2010
Jamaica	9 August 2013
Mexico	31 December 2014
Nicaragua	27 August 2010
Panama	4 February 1986
Paraguay*	1 July 2013
Peru	20 January 2014

Member State	*Reports received by 16 February 2014*
Saint Kitts and Nevis*	6 June 2014
Saint Lucia*	25 July 2013
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	
Suriname	16 September 2010
Trinidad and Tobago	25 July 2013
Uruguay*	1 September 2011
Venezuela*	14 January 2014

* Complied with article 24 for the first time between November 2010 and February 2015.

NPT/CONF.2015/6

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Background paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat

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I. Introduction

1. At its third session, from 28 April to 9 May 2014, the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided to invite the Secretary-General to prepare documentation taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.

2. The Preparatory Committee stated that the following general approach should apply to the proposed paper, similar to the approach applied for the preparation of background documentation for the previous review conferences: the paper must present balanced, objective and factual descriptions of the relevant developments, be as short as possible and be easily readable. It should reflect agreements reached, actual unilateral and multilateral measures taken, understandings adopted, formal proposals for agreements made and important political developments directly related to any of the foregoing. The paper should focus on the period since the 2010 Review Conference, including implementation of the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference.

3. The present paper is submitted pursuant to that request. Attention is also drawn to the background paper prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty.[1]

II. Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

4. On 11 May 1995, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted the resolution on the Middle East, sponsored by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America as depositaries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the resolution the Conference, inter alia, endorsed the aims and objectives of the peace process and recognized that efforts in that regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to a Middle East free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it called on States in the region not parties to the Treaty to accede to the Treaty and accept full-scope IAEA safeguards and urged nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States to fully cooperate with regional efforts to create a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. The text of the resolution is contained in the annex to the present paper.

[1] NPT/CONF.2015/1.

III. Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference

5. The 2010 Review Conference reaffirmed the commitment to universality of the Treaty, and States parties expressed their concern regarding the lack of progress in the achievement of universality and in the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which a majority of States parties believed seriously undermined the Treaty and represented a threat to regional and international peace and security. The 2010 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference and stressed that the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The 2010 Review Conference stated that the 1995 resolution was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at the prompt implementation of the resolution. The 2010 Review Conference reaffirmed its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognized that efforts in that regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. States parties regretted that little progress had been achieved towards the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East by the time of the 2010 Review Conference, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of accession by Israel to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date. The 2010 Review Conference stressed the necessity of strict adherence by all States parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty, urged all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and called upon all States to refrain from undertaking any measures that precluded the achievement of that objective.

6. The 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and endorsed the following practical steps to that end:

(a) The convening of a conference in 2012 by the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 conference should take as its terms of reference the 1995 resolution;

(b) The appointment by the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a facilitator with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 conference. The facilitator would also

assist in the implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 conference. The facilitator would report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings;

(c) The designation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a host Government for the 2012 conference;

(d) Additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 resolution, including that the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other relevant international organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained;

(e) The consideration of all offers aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 resolution, including the offer of the European Union to host a follow-on seminar to that organized in June 2008.

7. The 2010 Review Conference emphasized the requirement of maintaining parallel progress in substance and timing in the process leading to achieving the total and complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the region, nuclear, chemical and biological, and reaffirmed that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 resolution, through the Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chair of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, and further recognized the important role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the 1995 resolution and encouraged all efforts in that regard.

IV. Review of the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East, taking into account the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference

A. Efforts contributing to the achievement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process

8. In paragraph 1 of its resolution on the Middle East, the Review and Extension Conference endorsed the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognized that efforts in that regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. That was reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference.[2]

9. Observations on the current state of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on international efforts to move the peace process forward with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement can be found in the reports of the Secretary-General on the

[2] NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I).

peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, contained in documents A/65/380-S/2010/484 and Add.1, which covers the period from September 2009 to August 2010; A/66/367-S/2011/585, which covers the period from September 2010 to August 2011; A/67/364-S/2012/701, which covers the period from September 2011 to August 2012; A/68/363-S/2013/524, which covers the period from September 2012 to August 2013; and A/69/371-S/2014/650, which covers the period from September 2013 to August 2014.

B. Acceptance of full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear activities

10. As stipulated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution on the Middle East and in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,[3] all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so should place their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

11. The General Assembly, in numerous resolutions on the subject of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East[4] as well as on the subject of the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,[5] has called upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so to place all their nuclear activities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

12. At the 2010 Review Conference, all States not parties to the Treaty were called upon to accede to it without further delay and without any conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols consistent with the model additional protocol.[6] Those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities were also called upon to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapon development or deployment and to refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

13. The General Conference of the IAEA, in a series of resolutions on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East,[7] has reaffirmed the urgent need for all States in the Middle East forthwith to accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The General Conference has also called upon all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. The General Conference has also invited the States concerned to adhere to international non-proliferation regimes, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a means of complementing participation in a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and of strengthening peace and security in the region. Details of the steps taken towards

[3] NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex, decision 2.

[4] See, for example, resolution 3263 (XXIX).

[5] See, for example, resolution 69/78.

[6] IAEA document INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) and Corr.1.

[7] See, for example, IAEA resolutions GC(XXXV)/RES/571 and GC(58)/RES/16.

the implementation of the General Conference resolutions are given in the IAEA background paper on the Agency's activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty.[7]

14. All States of the Middle East region, as defined by IAEA,[8] except Djibouti, Israel and Somalia have brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. Djibouti signed its comprehensive safeguards agreement on 27 May 2010. Safeguards have been implemented at facilities in Israel pursuant to safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2.[9] Somalia has yet to take action in formalizing a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.[10]

15. Additional protocols are in force for Bahrain, the Comoros, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates. Djibouti, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Tunisia have signed but not yet brought into force additional protocols, and an additional protocol has been approved for Algeria but not yet signed.[11]

16. Of the States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, 11 States (Bahrain, the Comoros, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and the United Arab Emirates) implement the Small Quantities Protocol with the Agency. Of these, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania and Qatar have adopted the 2005 revised standardized text and modified criteria, with the adoptions by Kuwait and Mauritania in 2013. One State, Djibouti, that does not have a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force, signed the revised Small Quantities Protocol on 27 May 2010.

17. Between 2010 and 2014, at the request of a number of States, the IAEA General Conference considered an agenda item entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities". In 2010, 2013 and 2014, a number of States introduced a draft resolution under that agenda item, though in each instance the General Conference voted not to accept the resolution.

18. In its resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council recalled once again that resolution GOV/2006/14 of the IAEA Board of Governors states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery. In November 2013, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States (the E3+3) agreed on the Joint Plan of Action with the Islamic Republic of Iran with the aim of achieving a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure its nuclear programme would be exclusively peaceful. IAEA was asked to undertake monitoring and verification of nuclear-related measures to be implemented by the Islamic Republic of Iran.[12] In November 2013, the Islamic Republic of Iran and IAEA signed a Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation, which established

[8] IAEA considers the Middle East to include Algeria, Bahrain, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen (IAEA document GC(XXXIII)/887, para. 3).

[9] See "Safeguards Statement for 2013", IAEA Board of Governors, 2014.

[10] See IAEA document GOV/2014/45-GC(58)/15.

[11] See IAEA document "Conclusion of Additional Protocols: Status as of 31 December 2014".

[12] See IAEA document INFCIRC/855.

a step-by-step process to resolve outstanding issues, including those pertaining to a possible military dimension to the country's nuclear activities.[13]

C. Realization of universal adherence to the Treaty

19. Under the resolution on the Middle East and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, all States not yet parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve that objective.[14] All States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[15]

D. Efforts contributing to a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, taking into account the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference

20. The idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East dates back to the 1960s and was first formally raised by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Egypt in 1974. Since then, all the States of the region have expressed support for such a zone, including in the United Nations, where a resolution on the subject has been adopted annually by consensus in the General Assembly since 1980. Since 1991, the IAEA General Conference has also expressed support for this objective in an annual resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, which had been adopted without a vote until 2007. Despite the widespread support for the concept, little progress had been achieved towards the establishment and implementation of such a zone until the 2010 Review Conference endorsed a number of practical steps leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution.

21. General Assembly resolution 68/27 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East requested the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of its resolution 46/30 of 1991 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to the report of the Secretary-General of 10 October 1990[16] and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution to its sixty-ninth session.

22. Discussions within and outside the United Nations have revealed differences of view regarding how best to advance the concept of a Middle East nuclear-

[13] See IAEA document INFCIRC/856.

[14] NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex, decision 2, para. 1.

[15] The Secretariat received a note verbale on 18 February 2015 informing it "that on 10 February 2015 the Russian Federation as a depositary State of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has received an original of the verbal note from the State of Palestine on its joining the NPT … and proceeds from the understanding that the NPT enters into force for the State of Palestine starting on the above-mentioned date".

[16] A/45/435.

weapon-free zone and on preferred approaches to its establishment. There are different emphases on the sequencing and timing of possible steps; the relative importance of dealing with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; whether the global treaties are sufficient in scope and application; security and confidence-building and other measures; and verification standards. All countries in the region nevertheless are on record as supporting a zone that includes all weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical, as well as their delivery systems.[17]

23. The 2010 Review Conference endorsed a set of practical steps, mandating the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution (the depositaries of the Treaty: the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States), in consultation with the States of the region, to convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States, with the terms of reference for the conference to be taken from the 1995 resolution.

24. The 2010 Review Conference requested that a facilitator be appointed by the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The facilitator would assist in the implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 conference and report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings. The Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, were responsible for selecting a host Government for the 2012 conference.

25. Pursuant to the mandate agreed by the 2010 Review Conference, the Secretary-General initiated consultations in the second half of 2010 with the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the appointment of a facilitator and designation of a host Government for the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. In early 2011, the conveners extended their consultations to the States of the region and other interested parties to seek a broad range of views on how to move forward. On 14 October 2011, after wide consultations, the Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Finland, as facilitator and designated Finland as host Government for the conference.

26. Upon his appointment, the facilitator established a dedicated office to support his efforts and initiated regular contact with the conveners and the States of the region. Between October 2011 and May 2012, the facilitator carried out more than one hundred consultations in regional and other capitals, including those of all States of the region, the conveners and the other nuclear weapon States, as well as in major international centres including New York, Geneva, The Hague and Vienna. The consultations addressed a wide range of issues related to the establishment of the zone as well as the preparations for the conference, including its agenda,

[17] Ibid., and A/64/124 (Part I)/Add.1.

modalities and rules of procedure, with a view to holding the conference in 2012 as expressed in the mandate.

27. On 8 May 2012, the facilitator provided his first report to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference.[18] He indicated that while substantial progress had been made towards the implementation of the 1995 resolution and in undertaking preparations for the 2012 conference, it was clear that further and intensified efforts were needed by the facilitator, the conveners and the States of the region.

28. Immediately following the first session of the Preparatory Committee, the facilitator and conveners resumed their engagement with the States of the region, and the facilitator's office presented the States of the region with non-papers on the different substantive and organizational aspects of the conference, with the view of holding the conference no later than December 2012, in order to assist in identifying arrangements to be freely arrived at by the States of the region. On the basis of inputs received, the facilitator circulated updated papers in October 2012.

29. Despite those efforts, the conference was unable to be convened by the end of 2012, as not all States of the region were prepared to attend. On 23 and 24 November 2012, the conveners and facilitator issued separate statements regarding the postponement of the conference. Others, including the Secretary-General, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the League of Arab States Council also issued statements.[19] In response, the facilitator announced his intention to continue efforts to prepare for the convening at the earliest possible time of a successful conference to be attended by all the States of the region and, towards that end, proposed to hold multilateral consultations as soon as possible.

30. In early 2013, the facilitator and conveners continued to engage in substantial outreach with the States of the region in order to establish a framework for multilateral consultations to finalize the modalities, agenda and rules of procedure for the conference. On 29 April 2013, the facilitator reported on those activities to the second session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Conference,[20] which included more than 300 rounds of discussions with the States of the region, the conveners, the nuclear-weapon States, other States, relevant international organizations, civil society, academia and think-tanks and other relevant actors. The facilitator stressed that all the States of the Middle East and the conveners had expressed their willingness to continue the preparations for the conference and that he would intensify efforts to consult with all partners concerned. He reported on his attempts to hold multilateral consultations with the purpose of securing arrangements for the conference to be freely arrived at by the States of the region and thus take the process forward. He proposed to bring together all relevant parties

[18] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/11.

[19] See "League of Arab States Council Statement on Postponement of the ME WMD FZ Conference", Dan Joyner, Arms Control Law, 5 March 2013, available from http://armscontrollaw.com/2013/03/05/league-of-arab-states-council-statement-on-postponement-of-the-me-wmd-fz-conference; and "Statement by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission", 24 November 2012, available from http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_12893_en.htm.

[20] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/10.

for a constructive dialogue as an essential step for progress before, during and after the conference in Helsinki.

31. Between October 2013 and February 2014, the facilitator, together with the conveners of the conference and with the participation of States of the region, held three informal meetings in Glion, Switzerland, in order to facilitate agreement among the States of the region on the arrangements for the conference. The meetings provided an opportunity for an exchange of views on the conference and preparations for it, including discussions on the agenda, modalities and rules of procedure.

32. On 1 May 2014, the facilitator reported to the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Conference on the status of preparations for the conference.[21] While confirming that the parties remained ready to engage and make progress through an open and constructive approach, he noted that divergent views persisted regarding important aspects of the conference. The facilitator announced that there would be further informal meetings in order to arrive at an early agreement on the arrangements for the conference.

33. Between May and June 2014, the facilitator, together with the conveners of the conference and with the participation of States of the region, held two additional informal meetings in Geneva. The meetings allowed States of the region to continue their constructive engagement and serious consideration of the arrangements and outcome of the conference, including on the basis of non-papers and proposals circulated by the facilitator and conveners as well as by States of the region.

34. Despite the extended consultations and other activities, there continued to be differences among the parties on several important aspects of the conference, including on its agenda, and, by the end of 2014, agreement on the modalities for the conference had not been reached. Efforts to resume consultations were also affected by developments in the region, included increased tension and active hostilities. In 2015, the facilitator and conveners have continued their engagement with the States of the region with a view to finalizing the arrangements for the conference, including its agenda, at the earliest possible date in 2015.

Elimination of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

35. In response to various reports by Member States pertaining to the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, on 20 March 2013 the Secretary-General decided to establish the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (United Nations Mission) based on his authority under General Assembly resolution 42/37 C and Security Council resolution 620 (1988). The Secretary-General transmitted the report of the United Nations Mission of 16 September 2013 on the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus,[22] in which it concluded that chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale, resulting in numerous casualties, particularly among civilians and including many children. The final report of the United Nations Mission was transmitted on 13 December 2013.[23]

[21] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/18.
[22] A/67/997-S/2013/553.
[23] A/68/663-S/2013/735.

36. The Russian Federation and the United States agreed on a framework for the elimination of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and on 14 September 2013 the Syrian Arab Republic deposited its instrument of accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, making it the 190th State party to the Convention. On 27 September 2013, the Executive Council of OPCW established special procedures for the expeditious destruction of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic and stringent verification thereof.[24] On the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), which endorsed and made mandatory the special procedures adopted by the OPCW Executive Council and enabled the establishment of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic (the Joint Mission).[25] Pursuant to the timelines established by the OPCW Executive Council in October 2013, the removal of declared chemical weapons from the Syrian Arab Republic was completed on 23 June 2014. The Joint Mission formally closed on 30 September 2014. In unanimously adopting resolution 2118 (2013), the Security Council determined that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constituted a threat to international peace and security. At its 74th session, held from 8 to 11 October 2013, the OPCW Executive Council noted the accession of the Syrian Arab Republic and urgently called upon all States not party to the Convention to join without delay or precondition. The accession by the Syrian Arab Republic has resulted in there being only two States in the Middle East region that have yet to bring the Chemical Weapons Convention into force.

Proposal by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt

37. During his statement to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session, on 28 September 2013, Nabil Fahmy, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, announced a new proposal with three elements, including: (a) for all States in the Middle East, as well as the five permanent members of the Security Council, to deposit letters with the Secretary-General confirming their support for declaring the Middle East a region free from weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; (b) for all States in the region that have not signed or ratified any of the international instruments dealing with weapons of mass destruction to deposit letters with the Security Council, before the end of 2013, affirming their intention to join those treaties, in order to enable the Secretary-General to arrange for simultaneous accession by those States; (c) for the facilitator and conveners to further intensify their efforts to convene the conference.[26]

38. Pursuant to the first element of the proposal, the Secretary-General received such letters from 21 States from the region[27] as well as from one observer State.[28] Copies of all the letters in their original languages were made available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs.[29]

[24] See OPCW document EC-M-33/DEC.1.

[25] The Secretary-General and the OPCW Director General established the Joint Mission on 16 October 2013. See S/2013/629.

[26] Text of statement available from http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/EG_en.pdf.

[27] See A/68/781.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/menbcletters.

International Atomic Energy Agency Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East

39. The IAEA Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East took place from 21 to 22 November 2011 in Vienna.[30] The Forum, chaired by Jan Petersen, Resident Representative of Norway to IAEA, was held in response to a decision of the General Conference of IAEA,[31] which requested the Director General, inter alia, to develop an agenda and modalities which would help to ensure a successful forum on the relevance of the experience of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including confidence-building and verification measures, for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The Forum considered the experience of Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean in creating regional security regimes and achieving disarmament through establishing such zones. The main purposes of the Forum were to (a) study the lessons of other regions regarding the regional setting and context that had prevailed there before they began considering a nuclear-weapon-free zone; (b) review the existing multilaterally agreed principles for establishing such zones in populated areas of the world; (c) review the theory and practice of establishing the five existing nuclear-weapon-free zones; (d) discuss with representatives from the five existing zones their experience in promoting, negotiating and practically implementing negotiated arrangements for the zones; and (e) discuss the region of the Middle East in that context. The potential relevance of such experience to the case and region of the Middle East was also addressed.

European Union Follow-On Conferences

40. The European Union has actively supported efforts to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East in support of the implementation of the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Their efforts include Council decisions in 2010[32] and in 2012[33] that supported a number of conferences and papers that built on the European Union seminar held in 2008 entitled "Middle East Security, WMD Non-proliferation and Disarmament". The first European Union Non-Proliferation Consortium Seminar on the Middle East was held in July 2011[34] and the second Consortium Seminar, intended to promote confidence-building and in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in the Middle East, took place in November 2012.[35] The Consortium also organized a capacity-building workshop for mid-level diplomats in support of the conference in Helsinki in June 2014.[36] The Consortium has also included the 1995 resolution and the conference in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conferences held in 2012, 2013 and 2014.[37]

[30] See https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/nuclear-weapons-free-zones.
[31] See GC(44)/DEC/12 and GC(44)/OR.10, paras. 19-20.
[32] European Council decision 2010/799/CFSP, 13 December 2010.
[33] European Council decision 2012/422/CFSP, 23 July 2012.
[34] http://www.nonproliferation.eu/middleEastSeminar2012/firstSeminar.
[35] http://www.nonproliferation.eu/middleEastSeminar2012/secondSeminar.
[36] http://www.nonproliferation.eu/middleEastSeminar2012/workshop.
[37] http://www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/activities.php.

Role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the 1995 resolution

41. Civil society has continued to play a significant role in hosting Track II diplomacy meetings and producing papers, reports and books. Non-governmental organizations in the region and in other parts of the world have assisted in building expertise, knowledge and capacity on the topic of the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Annex

Resolution on the Middle East

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,

Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January 1992,[a] affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 of 15 December 1994,

Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,

Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in particular paragraph 14 thereof,

Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

1. *Endorses* the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that, in its report (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1), Main Committee III of the Conference recommended that the Conference "call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities";

3. *Notes with concern* the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

[a] S/23500.

Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. *Reaffirms* the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

5. *Calls upon* all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;

6. *Calls upon* all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Memorandum on activities relating to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

Submitted by the Pacific Islands Forum secretariat

Overview

1. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) entered into force on 11 December 1986, becoming the second treaty in the world to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated region (the first being the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, or the Treaty of Tlatelolco). There are 13 States parties to the Treaty, all of which are members of the premier political organization in the Pacific region, the Pacific Islands Forum (known as the South Pacific Forum at the time of the adoption of the Treaty).

2. The Treaty of Rarotonga contains the States parties' reaffirmation of the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing to world security. It specifically references article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for its recognition of the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

3. As the focal point for the Treaty, the Pacific Islands Forum secretariat continues to promote the Treaty and monitor national, regional and global developments relevant to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Background

4. The Treaty of Rarotonga was adopted and opened for signature at the sixteenth meeting of the South Pacific Forum, held in Rarotonga in August 1985. It was the culmination of a series of regional nuclear-free-zone proposals and initiatives dating back to the early 1960s, which were borne of the region's harsh experience with nuclear testing in the Pacific and the Forum members' concern about the arms race and the risk of nuclear war.

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5. The Treaty was signed and ratified by the 13 members of the South Pacific Forum,[1] namely Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

Scope and operation of the Treaty

6. The Treaty's area of application extends from the west coast of Australia to the boundary of the Latin American nuclear-free zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the east. It also extends from the equator to latitude 60° south, where the Antarctic Treaty establishes a completely demilitarized zone covering the entire continent.

7. The States parties to the Treaty undertake:

(a) Not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the zone (the term "nuclear explosive device" is used rather than "nuclear weapon" to emphasize that the States parties do not draw a distinction between devices that have military purposes and those for which a peaceful purpose is claimed);

(b) To prevent the testing and stationing of nuclear explosive devices in their territory;

(c) To take measures, including the application of full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in their territories, to prevent the diversion of fissionable material to non-peaceful purposes;

(d) Not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the zone, to prevent the dumping of such wastes and matter by anyone and to take no action to assist or encourage dumping.

8. The Treaty provides that each State party, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields. It also explicitly upholds the freedom of navigation on the high seas and territorial waters guaranteed by international law.

9. A comprehensive control system has been established to verify compliance with the Treaty. There are mechanisms, including provision for mandatory on-site inspection, to investigate any complaints that may be made about such compliance. There are also provisions for review, amendment and withdrawal, and for the boundaries of the zone to be extended as further countries join the Forum and become parties to the Treaty.

10. In addition to the verification procedures, the Treaty has a complaints procedure that involves the setting up of a consultative committee with a right of inspection. The sanction under the Treaty if the complaint is found to have substance is the immediate convening of a meeting of the Forum. That political sanction encourages the States parties to uphold their obligations under the Treaty, given that the repercussions would include jeopardizing the Treaty itself and the achievement of other objectives that they may wish to pursue in the region. No

[1] The South Pacific Forum was renamed the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000, following the admission of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of) and Palau. Those three States are not currently parties to the Treaty.

complaints have, however, ever been made and a consultative committee has never been convened.

11. The Treaty provides that it is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely. Withdrawal can be effected only on 12 months' notice and solely in the event of a violation by any State party of a provision of the Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty.

Protocols to the Treaty

12. The Treaty is supplemented by three protocols that were opened for signature in 1986. Under Protocol 1, the three States with territory in the zone (France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) agree to apply the key provisions of the Treaty to their respective territories. Under Protocols 2 and 3, nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any State party to the Treaty (or territory in the zone belonging to a State party to Protocol 1) and undertake not to test nuclear explosive devices in the zone.

13. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics China signed Protocols 2 and 3 in 1986 and 1987, respectively, and ratified both in 1988. France, the United Kingdom and the United States signed Protocols 1, 2 and 3 on 25 March 1996. France subsequently ratified the Protocols in the same year and the United Kingdom in 1997. The United States has yet to ratify them.

14. At their most recent meeting, held in Palau in July 2014, the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum encouraged the United States to ratify the Protocols as soon as possible, as indicated in the communiqué adopted.

Forum secretariat activities

15. As the focal point for the Treaty, the Forum secretariat has continued:

(a) To provide advice to member countries on the status and operation of the Treaty;

(b) To promote the Treaty in regional and international meetings dealing with security and disarmament issues;

(c) To liaise with the secretariats of other nuclear-free-zone treaties in relation to developments;

(d) To ensure public awareness of and access to the Treaty and documentation.

NPT/CONF.2015/8

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Memorandum from Mongolia regarding the consolidation of its international security and nuclear-weapon-free status

1. The present memorandum of the Government of Mongolia on consolidating its international security and nuclear-weapon-free status is being submitted in conformity with the decision regarding background documentation adopted by the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Additional information on Mongolia's status and the steps taken since the 2010 Review Conference to institutionalize that status can be found in NPT/CONF.2010/12 of 22 March 2010.

A brief history of the issue

2. Owing to its geopolitical location, in the second half of the twentieth century Mongolia, ally of the Soviet Union, was exposed to two "cold wars": one between East and West and one between China and the Soviet Union. In 1967, the Soviet Union established it military bases in Mongolia. Having experienced, during the height of Sino-Soviet tensions, the danger of being drawn into a possible conflict that could have involved the use of nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of Russian bases from Mongolia, in September 1992[1] Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and pledged to have that status internationally guaranteed.

3. Mongolia's initiative was welcomed by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. In 1993 and 1994, the five nuclear-weapon States made unilateral statements in support of the initiative. In the treaty on friendly relations and cooperation concluded with Mongolia in January 1993, the Russian Federation committed itself to respecting Mongolia's policy of not admitting the deployment on and transit through its territory of foreign troops and of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. China declared that its pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free zones or States applied to Mongolia. The United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stated that Mongolia would benefit from their positive and negative security assurances. France declared that its negative security assurances applied to Mongolia. The Government of Mongolia welcomed these statements of

[1] See the statement of the President of Mongolia made on 25 September 1992 at the general debate of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

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support as a sign of political support for the policy. That support was not, however, a clear recognition of its single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone status nor did it provide the legally binding security assurances that are provided to traditional nuclear-weapon-free zones. That is why Mongolia has for some time worked to institutionalize its status as a single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone.

4. As for the non-nuclear-weapon States, they all expressed full support not only for Mongolia's policy in general but also for its efforts to institutionalize that status.

5. In 1996 and 1997 Mongolia held talks with the five nuclear-weapon States regarding its initiative. Despite demonstrating general support for the initiative, however, those States were reluctant to consider Mongolia a nuclear-weapon-free zone because it was only a single State. Mongolia reasoned that in the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects it was pointed out that even individual countries could establish nuclear-weapon-free zones (A/10027/Add.1). The five nuclear-weapon States were still reluctant, however, to consider Mongolia as a fully fledged zone considering that doing so would detract from or undermine the incentives for establishing regional (traditional) zones. During the talks, it was agreed that, until the five nuclear-weapon States accepted the concept of a single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone, Mongolia could be considered as a State with a unique nuclear-weapon-free status. Thus, it was agreed to use the term "status" instead of "zone" and that the content of the status would be defined by the States concerned. The five nuclear-weapon States also expressed reluctance to agree to the concept of "institutionalizing" the status. During the talks, it was agreed that, to make the status credible, Mongolia's security needed to be addressed in a broader context, including with respect to the country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, the independence of its foreign policy, its economic security and its ecological balance. This understanding formed the basis of General Assembly resolution 53/77 D, entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status", adopted in 1998 without a vote.

6. In follow-up to General Assembly resolution 53/77 D, Mongolia approached the five nuclear-weapon States to define the status and acquire from them appropriate security assurances. In 2000, it adopted legislation that defined the status at the national level and criminalized acts connected with violating the status (see A/55/56-S/2000/160, annex I). In response to Mongolia's request for appropriate security assurances, in October 2000 the five nuclear-weapon States issued a joint statement providing political security assurances to Mongolia (A/55/530-S/2000/1052, annex). In that statement, they declared that the commitments regarding positive and negative security assurances that they had made separately in 1995 applied to Mongolia (see Security Council resolution 984 (1995)). The Mongolian side welcomed the joint statement as an important step in institutionalizing the status internationally. At the same time, it let the five nuclear-weapon States know that the assurances did not reflect Mongolia's unique location, its interests or the state of its relations with them.

7. In September 2001, bearing in mind that Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status still lacked clear international definition, representatives of Mongolia, the five nuclear-weapon States and the United Nations met in Sapporo, Japan, to consider ways and means of defining and strengthening the status (see A/57/59, annex). The recommendation that emerged from the meeting was that Mongolia needed either to

conclude a trilateral treaty with its two neighbours, China and the Russian Federation, or seek a more ambitious multilateral treaty involving all five nuclear-weapon States.

8. In January 2002, as a follow-up to the Sapporo recommendations, Mongolia presented to its neighbours the draft basic elements of a possible trilateral treaty regarding its status. The draft elements were generally based on the international practice of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, but also reflected the specific situation of Mongolia as a landlocked country whose only two neighbours were nuclear-weapon States. Bearing in mind the responses of its neighbours, Mongolia drafted a trilateral treaty and a draft additional protocol to it and presented them to the neighbours, expressing the hope that negotiations on the drafts could be commenced in the near future. China and the Russian Federation met with Mongolia in Geneva in March and September of 2009 to exchange views on the drafts. At the second meeting, they presented to Mongolia a joint paper containing questions and comments on the provisions of the drafts. At the end of that meeting, they expressed the need to have the other three nuclear-weapon States — France, the United Kingdom and the United States — join the talks since they believed that any security assurance made to Mongolia needed to be extended by all five nuclear-weapon States, not only by China and the Russian Federation.

9. In preparation for the 2010 Review Conference, the delegation of Mongolia proposed mentioning, in the final document of the Conference, the trilateral meetings held in Geneva. Owing to the position of the five nuclear-weapon States, however, the Conference only welcomed the declaration by Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status and expressed support for the measures taken by Mongolia to consolidate and strengthen that status (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), para. 100).[2]

Steps taken to institutionalize Mongolia's status since the 2010 Review Conference

10. Mindful of the fact that viability of the status depended to a certain extent on how the legislation on the issue was implemented, in January 2014 the parliamentary standing committee on security and foreign policy of Mongolia set up a working group that monitored and evaluated the implementation of the law, and then submitted a set of recommendations to the Government for its consideration. The working group recommended that the Government continue to cooperate with the five nuclear-weapon States, the States parties to treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones and other States and international organizations with the aim of strengthening further the status, consider possible amendments to the law and report to the standing committee on how Mongolian flag vessels were implementing the law, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and other legal commitments on international shipping security rules. The Government is also preparing to submit to the parliament for its ratification an amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

[2] See also paragraph 8 of the final document of the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), which reads: "The Conference welcomes and supports the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, and takes note of the recent adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation defining that status as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions, as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation and a practical contribution to promoting political stability and predictability in the region."

11. After resuming contact and talks with the five nuclear-weapon States in 2011 and 2012 regarding its nuclear-weapon-free status, on 17 September 2012 Mongolia and the five States signed parallel declarations at United Nations Headquarters concerning security assurances. In its declaration, Mongolia, based on its legislation of 2000, not only reaffirmed the general prohibitions implemented pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but also pledged not to station or transport nuclear weapons or parts or components of such weapons nor nuclear waste by any means through its territory and welcomed the pledges made by the five nuclear-weapon States in 2000 and on that day (17 September 2012).

12. On the other hand, in their joint declaration, the five nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their intent to cooperate with Mongolia in implementing General Assembly resolution 53/77 D, reaffirmed also the assurances they had provided in the joint statement made in 2000 and, in addition, affirmed their intent, as long as Mongolia maintained its nuclear-weapon-free status, to respect that status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it.

13. In 2013 and 2014, a Mongolian non-governmental organization, Blue Banner, organized national and regional round-table discussions to contribute ideas on practical ways and means of further institutionalizing the status and shared its findings with the Government.

International support of the status

Bilateral support

14. Many States with which Mongolia has close relations have continued to express support for Mongolia's unique nuclear-weapon-free status and the policy to properly institutionalize it. On 26 June 2011, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, applauded, in a joint United States-Mongolian statement, Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and, in August 2014, the President of China, Xi Jinping, expressed support for Mongolia's policy to promote the status at both the international and regional levels.

Regional support

15. During the period under review, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA) welcomed, at its summit in 2010, Mongolia's status as contributing to security and confidence-building in the CICA region. At its 2014 summit, CICA welcomed the parallel declarations of 2012 as a concrete contribution to non-proliferation and the enhancement of regional confidence and predictability. At its 2012 ministerial meeting, CICA welcomed Mongolia's declaration regarding its nuclear-weapon-free status and expressed support for its consolidation and related reinforcement measures.

16. The Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also expressed support for Mongolia's status. In a statement, the Chair of the twenty-first ASEAN Regional Forum, held in Nay Pyi Taw on 10 August 2014, stated that the participating ministers welcomed Mongolia's status, and the 2012 joint declaration of the five nuclear-weapon States regarding the status, as a concrete contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and promoting confidence and predictability in the region.

17. In November 2014, an international conference on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free north-east Asia was held in Ulaanbaatar. In the final document of the conference, participants welcomed Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status policy both as a concrete contribution to regional stability and as an innovative approach to addressing nuclear threat-related issues. They also welcomed the joint declaration of 2012 of the five nuclear-weapon States and expressed the hope that Mongolia's experience would be an inspiring example in addressing similar cases.

Multilateral support

18. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has consistently supported Mongolia's status. In May 2011, at its Sixteenth Ministerial Conference and Commemorative Meeting, held in Bali, Indonesia, the Movement expressed support for Mongolia's policy aimed at institutionalizing its status and for the measures taken to consolidate and strengthen that status. In that regard, the ministers welcomed the start of talks between Mongolia and its two neighbours on the development of the required legal instrument and expressed the hope that the talks would soon result in the conclusion of an international instrument institutionalizing Mongolia's status.

19. At the summit of the Movement held in Tehran in August 2012, Heads of State and Government again expressed their support for Mongolia's policy to institutionalize the status and for the measures taken to consolidate and strengthen it. In that regard, they reiterated their support for the talks by Mongolia with China and the Russian Federation on the conclusion of an international instrument institutionalizing the status. The final document of the Seventeenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement, held in Algiers from 26 to 29 May 2014, reaffirmed the ministers' support for Mongolia's status as well as its policy to institutionalize it.

20. In the outcome document of the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held in New York on 30 April 2010, participants expressed their full support for Mongolia's policy of institutionalizing the status and welcomed the 2009 Geneva talks with its neighbours (see NWFZM/CONF.2010/1, para. 23).

21. The General Assembly of the United Nations was the first multilateral international organization to have welcomed Mongolia's initiative and has, since 1998, been considering every second year the issue entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status" and adopting resolutions thereon. In its first resolution on that issue, adopted in 1998, the Assembly welcomed the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, while in subsequent resolutions it welcomed and expressed support for the measures taken by Mongolia to consolidate and strengthen that status. Despite having expressed its conviction that international recognition of Mongolia's status would contribute to enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region, owing to the position of the five nuclear-weapon States the Assembly has never been able to officially recognize and welcome the status. Mongolia believes that the signature by the five nuclear-weapon States of the 2012 joint declaration, in which they expressed their intent to respect the status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it, presumes that those States recognize the status (as defined in the Mongolian law of 2000 and the parallel declarations of 2012) and hence will not object to having the Assembly welcome both the status and Mongolia's measures to consolidate it. Since

2010, Mongolia has raised this issue with the five nuclear-weapon States on a number of occasions and will continue to do so until that gap or discrepancy in logic and practice is removed.

Looking ahead

22. During the 23 years since Mongolia has declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has worked to have that status internationally guaranteed, much progress has been made with the widespread support of States Members of the United Nations and States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Although, because of the position of the five nuclear-weapon States, Mongolia has not been recognized as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, its unique status, as demonstrated above, has been widely recognized as a contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and promoting regional confidence and predictability.

23. Mongolia believes that, in order to be viable, its status needs to be promoted at three levels: national, regional and international. In the past, Mongolia mainly promoted the status at the national and international levels. Once the General Assembly officially recognizes the status, the focus of Mongolia's efforts will shift to the immediate region. To that end, it has already raised the issue within the ASEAN Regional Forum.

24. In sum, Mongolia will:

(a) Continue to work with the five nuclear-weapon States to have the General Assembly formally recognize and welcome the status;

(b) Continue monitoring implementation of its unique legislation;

(c) Cooperate further with other nuclear-weapon-free zones, States parties to such zones and like-minded States to strengthen cooperation with traditional nuclear-weapon-free zones and promote a world free of nuclear weapons;

(d) Work to make the status an important element of non-proliferation and promoting regional confidence and predictability;

(e) Play an active role in promoting the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in north-east Asia.

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2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Ireland

Introduction

1. Pursuant to action 20 of the action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Ireland is submitting the present summary report. The report is within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty and relates to the implementation of the action plan, as well as to article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". It is also related to the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 in that regard.

2. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to pursue nuclear disarmament.

3. Ireland underscores, and keeps at the forefront of all its policy considerations, the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, as highlighted in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. At the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, held in September 2013, the then Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Ireland, Eamon Gilmore, noted that the inclusion of that reference to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons offered a powerful means by which to reframe the entire debate about nuclear weapons and return to first principles. We must at all costs prevent the proliferation of those inhumane weapons and press for complete nuclear disarmament. We believe that the humanitarian imperative for nuclear disarmament is written into the DNA of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ireland has consistently worked with like-minded States to deliver joint statements on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament in successive

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meetings pertaining to the Treaty and of the First Committee. In 2013 and 2014, Ireland actively participated in the international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held in Norway, Mexico and, most recently, Austria. Ireland provided funding to support the conference held in Mexico, specifically for the participation of a number of least developed States parties to the Treaty. We also provided funding for the participation of least developed States parties in the conference held in Austria and for the organization of a civil society forum in advance of the conference.

Nuclear disarmament (actions 1-22)

4. Ireland notes its strong commitment to the principles and objectives of nuclear disarmament agreed upon by the 2010 Review Conference. It has pursued policies that are fully compatible with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons and welcomed the agreement by the 2010 Review Conference on the action plan, which included concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. With regard to the Conference on Disarmament, Ireland notes the central role that the Conference has played in promoting the rule of law in disarmament, in particular its achievements, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Despite those achievements, however, the Conference has been in stalemate for a long time. Ireland agrees that the Conference should immediately begin to discuss effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Ireland, represented by the then Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Micheál Martin, participated in the high-level meeting on revitalizing the work of the Conference and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations, held in 2010. He noted our regret that the Conference had not engaged in substantive work for more than a decade and called for the negotiation of a treaty on fissile material that should include a verification mechanism and cover existing stocks. Ireland welcomed the decision by the General Assembly in 2012 to establish two new mechanisms to facilitate discussions on topics that the Conference had been unable to take forward. Ireland formally submitted a position paper to the group of governmental experts tasked with making recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein and actively participated in the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, which adopted its report by consensus in August 2013. Ireland hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will engage with the process and consider constructively the list of options produced by the Working Group for taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.

6. Ireland has always been a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. By prohibiting all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, the Treaty will impede the development and qualitative

improvement of nuclear weapons. Ireland signed the Treaty in 1996 and ratified it in 1999. At the most recent Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2013, the then Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Eamon Gilmore, repeated our call upon those Annex 2 States, whose ratification was required before the Treaty could enter into force, to sign and ratify it without further delay. Ireland believes that the entry into force of the Treaty will significantly strengthen the international security architecture built on the foundations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and will represent an important step along the path to a world without nuclear weapons. Ireland commends the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization for its excellent work in building up the international monitoring system in anticipation of the Treaty's entry into force. This enables the Preparatory Commission to verify compliance with the Treaty on a global basis. The interpretation of data will be at the core of the verification system, and Ireland participates fully in the exchange of data with the International Data Centre in Vienna through our own national data centre based in Dublin. In 2014, additional funding was provided to the national data centre in order to upgrade its systems to the standards of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

7. Action 9 of the 2010 action plan encourages the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted a resolution on the Middle East in which it called for the establishment of an effectively viable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Ireland sees progress on that resolution as a key objective and, at the 2010 Review Conference, brokered agreement on a text emphasizing the importance of a process leading to the full implementation of the resolution and setting out a number of practical steps, including the convening of a conference in 2012. Ireland is disappointed that the conference could not be convened to date and is supportive of continuing international efforts, in particular those of the conference facilitator and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Security Policy of Finland, Jaakko Laajava, to convene a conference on the issue at the earliest possible opportunity.

8. Ireland recognizes the importance of cooperation between Governments, the United Nations, national and regional organizations and civil society. An amount of €50,000 was granted to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research by Ireland to conduct a research project on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and understanding United Nations coordination and response. The aim of the project is to contribute to a fact-based understanding of the consequences of a variety of scenarios involving a nuclear detonation and the obstacles to any United Nations-coordinated international response. Ireland has also provided support to the Institute's *Disarmament Forum* publication, which offers in-depth and up-to-date information and analysis in the areas of security and disarmament.

9. Cooperation with civil society in the disarmament and non-proliferation sphere is vitally important to facilitating informed discussion on the subject and to providing valuable monitoring of disarmament negotiations for international stakeholders. Ireland has a long-standing cooperative relationship with Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,

in particular. Ireland has provided funding to that organization since 2006 and regularly engages actively with it, including at international disarmament forums such as the Review Conferences, the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament.

10. Action 22 of the 2010 action plan encourages all States to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. In March 2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Ireland, in conjunction with University College Cork and the Embassy of Japan in Ireland, hosted a major disarmament and non-proliferation education symposium entitled "Disarmament and non-proliferation: historical perspectives and future objectives". It brought together policymakers, academics, members of the Defence Forces and human rights advocates to consider historical and current disarmament issues. An atomic bomb survivor (hibakusha), Setsuko Thurlow, was present and provided a personal account of her experience, which added greatly to the educational impact of the symposium. She also visited and spoke at a number of schools. The symposium was attended by diplomatic officials, members of civil society, academics and second-level and third-level students. Ireland attaches great importance to disarmament and non-proliferation education as a means of advancing the goals of the Treaty. Arising from the symposium, a number of papers by Irish and international academics on disarmament and non-proliferation issues were published in the journal *Irish Studies in International Affairs*.

11. Ireland has also provided financial support to Atomic Reporters for a series of workshops involving senior journalists from countries of the Middle East reporting on nuclear issues. Atomic Reporters provides much-needed resources for journalists reporting on nuclear proliferation, the safety of nuclear power, security and other related topics. The goal of the workshops is to educate and raise awareness of nuclear disarmament issues, non-proliferation and proposals for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Nuclear non-proliferation (actions 23-46)

12. Ireland has consistently supported efforts to promote the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The status of Ireland as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty is also confirmed by the comprehensive system of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, which has continued to assure the international community of the compliance of Ireland with its obligations under the Treaty.

13. Ireland supports the call by previous Review Conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ireland has had a safeguards agreement in force since 1977 and brought into force an additional protocol in 2004. Ireland continues to urge States parties to the Treaty that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible.

14. Ireland has been involved in the enhancement and development of the IAEA safeguards system, including through the timely payment of our assessed contributions and through European Union contributions. Ireland has also

contributed to the Technical Cooperation Fund. Ireland resumed its position as a member of the Board of Governors of IAEA in September 2014. Ireland consistently promotes universal compliance by States with their non-proliferation obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

15. Action 36 of the 2010 action plan encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls. Ireland applies the understandings of the Zangger Committee and the guidelines developed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime when assessing applications for export licences. Ireland, as a State member of the European Union, is committed to implementing the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, adopted in December 2003.

16. Action 42 of the 2010 action plan calls upon all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. Ireland ratified the amendment to the Convention in September 2014.

17. Ireland adheres to the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the Board of Governors of IAEA in 2004.

18. Ireland signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and is finalizing the ratification procedures. Ireland encourages all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy (actions 47-64)

19. Ireland provided financial support to IAEA for the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy in 2013. The funding was earmarked to cover integrated missions in three sub-Saharan African countries, which would assess existing national capacity and future needs in terms of cancer control. The initiative offered Ireland the opportunity to contribute to the third pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty — the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. By demonstrating a tangible benefit of adherence to the Treaty, the Programme's work also promotes the full implementation of the Treaty's provisions.

20. In 2010, 2011 and 2012, Ireland provided funding to the IAEA laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria, specifically the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories (the Nuclear Material Laboratory and the Environmental Sample Laboratory). The Nuclear Material Laboratory analyses nuclear material samples collected from all points of the nuclear fuel cycle and the results are used to verify States' nuclear material accountancy declarations.

21. Ireland has ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and is in the process of ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Ireland encourages all States to become parties to those conventions at the earliest possible opportunity.

22. Action 62 of the 2010 action plan encourages ongoing dialogue between coastal and shipping States regarding confidence-building measures concerning the maritime transport of nuclear materials. Ireland chaired the dialogue process between coastal and shipping States in 2012 and has continued to participate actively in its work.